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Dripping Red Ink at 37,000 Feet 
Profit figures for the nation's most glamorous 
industry, the airlines, have looked positively 
dowdy these last few years. Indeed, the air-
lines have been dripping substantial quan-
tities of red ink because of the strong head-
winds of recession, inflation, and OPEC price 
hikes. In this environment, the air controllers' 
strike appeared (at least on the surface) to be a 
crippling blow. 
The airlines normally handle 86 percent of all 
U.S. common-carrier intercity traffic, and 
travelers prefer them even to the private auto 
for all trips over 500 miles. Thus, air travel 
jumped, between 1970 and 1980, from 132 
billion to 254 billion revenue passenger 
miles. But the bottom line has wobbled con-
siderably in this decade of economic shocks 
(see chart); in particular, operating profits 
shifted from an unparalleled $1,365 million 
plus figure in 1978 to an equally unparalleled 
$225-million deficit figure in 1980. This 
year's modest first-half recovery in profits 
now seems likely to be swamped in more red 
ink, since the controllers struck at the begin-
ning of  the peak August vacation-travel 
period-and since (in the words of one sad-
dened airline spokesman) "You can't sell 
Christmas toys in January." 
In the intricate input-output matrix of  the U.S. 
economy, the sudden strike-initiated cutback 
in airline travel has affected a number of in-
dustries that depend heavilyon the airlines-
or that compete with them. Long after the 
strike crisis ends, however, the industry (and 
its suppliers) will still have to deal with the 
problems of a sluggish inflation-ridden econ-
omy, and with the problems (and opportun-
ities) created by the need to make its own 
decisions in a deregulated environment. 
Impact of strike 
Several weeks after the start of the crisis, the 
nation's air travel has settled into a new rou-
tine of reduced service. The Federal Aviation 
Administration installed a makeshift crew of 
nonstrikers and supervisors when about 
13,000 of  the 17,000 unionized controllers 
walked off the job. At first, the FAA sharply 
reduced scheduled "trunk" and commuter 
airline flights at 22 major airports, and for the 
nation as a whole, imposed a 20-percent 
overall cutback in scheduled flight opera-
tions. Transportation Secretary Drew Lewis 
envisions an increase in flight volume to 
about 90 percent of normal by early next 
year-but also envisions a continuation of 
substantial flight delays during the peak 
morning and late-afternoon flying times. 
The airlines previously had counted on a 
traditionally profitable third quarter to offset 
the $75-million operating loss recorded in 
the first six months of 1981. Instead, they 
have been losing an estimated $1 O-million a 
day during the early days of the strike, with 
relatively the heaviest losses being felt by the 
small feeder airlines that had grown so 
rapidly in the past several years. As a result, 
one-fifth or more of  the nation's 339,000 air-
line employees may face layoffs in coming 
months. A weakening profit picture also faces 
airline-dependent activities-including air-
port hotels, airborne meal-service firms, 
vacation resorts, travel agents, and municipal 
airport authorities. But by the same token, the 
picture has brightened for competing forms of 
transportation, such as railroads, bus lines 
and car-rental services. 
The longer the crisis continues-perhaps 
almost two years if an entire new cadre of 
controllers must be trained-then the more 
will industry come to rely on other forms of 
communication to carryon the nation's busi-
ness. This means intensified use of the tele-
phone, of course, as well as a boost to the 
infant teleconferencing industry, which uses 
satellite-relayed television to bring together 
executives, salesmen or other groups located 
in different cities. Teleconferencing is still an 
expensive proposition; one firm (Atlantic 
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in costs over the next year to establish a 
permanent network. But teleconferencing is 
also a decreasing-cost industry, being based 
on inexpensive access to satellite trans-
mission as well as another technical break-
through which substitutes optical fibers as a 
substitute for copper wiring. And with the 
increased cost of  airfares, hotels and meals-
plus now the inconvenience of air travel 
teleconferencing may soon become a pre-
ferred form of holding meetings. 
Condition of the airlines ... 
Nothing concentrates an executive's mind 
more than the sight of red ink, and that is 
doubly true of  an industry that, with the strike, 
now seems likely to spend its second straight 
year in the minus column. In 1978, the air-
linf's posted record operating profits of 
$1,365 million on the heels of a sharp boost 
in aircraft utilization, with the revenue-pas-
senger load factor jumping from 55.9 to 61.5 
percent within a single year. In 1979, the 
airlines filled  even  more seats  with a 63.0-
percent load factor, but their profit picture 
abruptly worsened in the wake of the lengthy 
United Air Lines strike, the DC-1 0 grounding, 
and the sharp rise in OPEC oil prices. Then, in 
1980, heavy losses developed as the pas-
senger load factor dropped to 59.0 percent, 
following a recession-induced 7-percent 
drop in passenger numbers and 3-percent 
drop in revenue passenger miles. 
The industry had already begun to retrench in 
response to these developments, and the 
strike-enforced restrictions will only accele-
rate that process. Airlines are now likely to 
ground their less efficient planes; of their 
2,500-plane fleet about 500 planes incor-
porate 20-year old technology and were de-
signed when fuel cost 11  cents instead of 89 
cents a gallon. They are also likely to curtail 
fl ights on routes with few passengers, and 
concentrate on more profitable routes -es-
pecially those going through a "hub" city 
where connecting fl ights meet. With capacity 
curtailed, passenger load factors will rise 
again, and airlines will be able to withdraw 
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discount-fare offers and thus boost their 
revenues. 
In some ways, the situation today resembles 
the 1974 situation, when another outside 
shock-the Arab oil embargo-created a jet-
fuel shortage and forced the airlines to 
ground planes and boost fares. At that time, 
the airlines reduced payrolls by 7 percent 
over a two-year period ina successfu I effort to 
restoretheirfinancial health. The same could 
occur again today as the industry reduces its 
capacity in line with its reduction in 
scheduled flights. 
... and the aircraft producers 
No one can be watching this situation more 
intently that the aircraft producers: Boeing 
(the industry leader with almost two-thirds of 
total commercial-aircraft sales), Airbus In-
dustrie, Lockheed, and McDonnell Douglas. 
Firm contract orders reached a peak $18.2 
billion in 1979, butthen fell to $10.6 billion 
last year as airline purchasing agents reduced 
their orders following their own industry'S 
loss of passenger traffic. A further order de-
cline is likely in 1981, and probably in 1982 
as well. 
Until recently, aircraft producers had 
counted on a strong market in the middle and 
later 1980's. For example, Boeing had fore-
cast a $128-billion market for commercial 
aircraft through 1990, with large new orders 
being generated because of  the airlines' need 
to improve fuel efficiency, replace aging 
planes, and meet Federal noise-abatement 
laws by  the 1985 deadline. Boeing develop-
ed its 757 and 767 models to meet these 
requirements-especially the fuel require-
ment, since those models will consume about 
one-third less fuel than the jets they replace. 
That in itself is a major consideration, since 
the airlines' annual fuel bill has jumped from 
$1.1  to $9.2 billion over the past decade-
from 12.7 to 30.5 percent of  total expenses. 
Most such sales estimates were made before 
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tainly before the strike forced cutbacks in 
service. This raises questions about the 
strength of current purchase commitments. 
The airlines expanded their fleets by 12 per-
cent between  1978 and  1980, after a half-
decade of stability, and under present cir-
cumstances many of their older planes are 
becoming a drag on the market. Several de-
ficit-ridden airlines are now trying to post-
pone or cancel deliveries of planes on order, 
and we may see more of this behavior until 
the industry's load factors (and profits) 
improve. 
Competitive situation 
Some critics blame the industry's problems 
on the Federal government's attemptto intro-
duce a greater measure of competition into 
the industry, under the deregulation policies 
of  two Civil Aeronautics Board chairmen, 
Alfred Kahn and Marvin Cohen, as enshrined 
in the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. The 
act provided for the eventual phase-out or 
transfer of all the functions of  the CAB, the 
principal regulatory agency in the air-service 
field. (The FAA, the major actor in the present 
strike, is concerned primarily with air safety.) 
By the end of  this year, the CAB will lose most 
of its remaining authority over domestic 
routes, such as who flies where or when. By 
the end of next year, it wi  II lose control over 
domestic fares and over airline mergers and 
interlocking relationships-and two years 
after that, the agency will go out of business 
completely. 
In a 1978 address to the New York Society of 
Security Analysts, Alfred Kahn cited the 
prime lesson of40 years of  airline regulation: 
"An industry that is deterred from price com-
petition, whether because of oligopolistic 
self-restraint or by cartel-like controls, will, if 
there remain incentives to compete, do so 
instead in service. If, for one reason or 
another, price is prevented from falling to 
marginal cost, then marginal cost will adjust 
upward to price. And if super-normal profits 
consequent on restriction of entry cannot be 
competed away through price reduction, 
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they will be competed away through service 
rivalry." Thus, until recent years, the CAB 
denied airline customers the possibility of  dif-
ferent price/service combinations-and in-
stead, encouraged ovet-scheduling, luxur-
ious services (including airborne fashion 
shows), and excessive increases in labor and 
other costs. 
In a report for the Council of Economic 
Advisers, George Eads made th is poi nt statis-
tically by showing that unit costs (and hence 
fares) rose at a much slower pace after dereg-
ulation than before, despite sharp increases 
in both periods in prices of inputs (such as 
equipment, labor and aviation fuel). Unit 
costs rose by more than two-thirds of the 
increase in input prices between 1973 and 
1977, but by less than one-third of the 
increase in input prices between 1977 and 
1979. Deregulation-generated productivity 
gains accounted for the difference between 
the two periods. Primarily, the airlines in-
creased the efficiency with which they utiliz-
ed their primary capital assets-their aircraft 
-by  filling more seats on each flight and by 
keeping their planes flying longer hours. They 
recorded similar efficiency gains in the utili-
zation of their workforce and fuel supplies. 
The initial phase-out of CAB powers over 
airline fares and routes thus worked very well 
for most airlines and the traveling public on 
the economic upswing. The real test has 
come with the more recent downswing and 
with the crisis created by the controllers' 
strike. For instance, the airlines somehow 
must generate $1  billion or more in profits in 
each of the next several years if  they hope to 
finance the fuel-efficient aircraft now on 
order. But most analysts believe that they can 
achieve that goal only through the operating 
flexibility possible in an environment of de-
regulation.ln any event, as one airline execu-
tive says, "Results will be determined not by a 
regu latory agency but by the ru les that 
grown-ups play by." 
William Burke 'J!l1!J 'O)SPU1!J:J  U1!S 
ZSL  'ON IIW~Hd 
GIVd 
:I!)V  ISOd 's'n 
11V\I\I SSV1J ISHI:J 
SS\11~  .LSt:ll.:l 
U01~U!4St'M • 4t'ln ..  UO~i3JO •  t'Pt't\i3N  ..  o4epi 
!!EMt'H  ..  E!UJ0J!ll:~J  •  EUOZP'v'  ..  E>lsEI'v' 
(G)~~~~W\2?Jr~ \\ll\2?CS 
~  (G)  24IW\2?cm 
@i\\Jr@~@(Q( IT\2?Jr@rr»@~ 
~  \ill~W~Jr~d[~<ill 'iSiI~Jr~~~~CQI 
BANKING DATA-TWELfTH fEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
{Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
Large Commercial 8anlcs 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total # 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total# 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total # 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
(Large negotiable CD's) 
Weekly Averages 
of Daily Figures 
Member 8ank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (  + )/Deficiency (-) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (+ )/Net borrowed (  - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 










































Dollar  Percent 
12,727  9.2 
13,411  11.5 
6,174  18.4 
6,274  13.3 
679  2.8 
208  18.3 
- 96  - 1.5 
- 584  - 3.8 
- 2,663  - 6.0 
3,712  -11.4 
851  2.9 
21,639  34.8 
21,942  40.6 
11,489  50.8 
Weekended  Comparable. 
7/29/81  year-ago period 
75  16 
105  12 
- 31  4 
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